Allocating scarce transmission capacity without displacing system-valuable loads
Fingrid has restricted new connections above 10 MW in several Southern Finland areas until early 2027 due to transmission capacity saturation. Simultaneously, data centres are competing for hundreds of megawatts of 24/7 flat load. This memo proposes a two-track connection mechanism: flexible loads (industry, SGFA nodes, electrolysis, CHP replacements) receive priority access via the standard process; inflexible loads (data centres with 24/7 flat profiles) compete within a capped annual quota via auction. The auction produces a price signal — inflexibility has a cost — and directs proceeds to Fingrid's grid investment fund. The mechanism requires no new legislation; it builds on the flexible connection agreement framework in force since February 2026.
Fingrid's transmission grid in Southern Finland is approaching saturation. New connections above 10 MW have been restricted in multiple areas until early 2027. The restriction reflects both current load growth and the pipeline of committed data centre investments — 17 projects with investment decisions taken, aggregate capacity potentially exceeding 2,200 MW by 2030. The restriction is not arbitrary: it operates within the flow-based market coupling framework adopted by all Nordic TSOs on 29 October 2024 (day-ahead markets) and extended to long-term capacity on 31 October 2025. Available connection capacity per region is now calculated through this harmonised Nordic methodology, which considers the full Nordic grid's physical constraints rather than simple bilateral NTC values.
The connection queue does not distinguish between load types. A 500 MW data centre and a 50 MW adjustable electrolyser queue under the same rules. This is a governance failure: the allocation mechanism does not price flexibility, and no institution guides applicants toward the system-valuable mix.
Inflexible loads — data centres running 24/7 flat profiles — occupy transmission capacity permanently. They do not offer frequency reserves, do not shift consumption in response to price signals, and do not support the grid's balancing needs during high-stress periods. Their net fiscal contribution is, according to Verohallinto Director General Heikura (May 2026), presently negative for the largest operators.
Flexible loads — industrial processes that can shift timing, electrolysers that absorb surplus, SGFA-type nodes that simultaneously produce district heat and grid reserves, CHP replacements — deliver system value beyond their electricity consumption. They reduce the compound risk described in TN-009: the coincidence of cold, still, dry conditions with declining domestic firm capacity.
Flexible and inflexible loads compete for the same connection capacity under rules that treat them identically. This systematically displaces system-valuable loads in favour of high-capital, infrastructure-light operators. The result is consistent with SM-010's coordination failure diagnosis: individually rational, systemically costly.
SM-011 is not a restriction on data centres. It is a redefinition of what a large grid connection means. The optimisation function changes:
Current: fastest applicant → capacity winner
SM-011: highest resilience contribution → capacity winner
This is not a novel institutional form. Finnish society already accepts that shared infrastructure — regulated waterways, ports, rail networks, aviation slots — cannot be allocated on pure speed-of-application. Mandatory minimum flow releases on regulated rivers are not negotiated each spring; they are encoded in water permits and enforced automatically. The Vuoksi minimum flow of 300 m³/s (May 2026) is a legal constraint that operates regardless of commercial interest.
SM-011 applies the same logic to the electricity grid. A large continuous load is not a passive consumer of shared infrastructure. It is a participant in system stability. Its connection terms should reflect that participation — not through voluntary commitments or press releases, but through a rule encoded before the situation arises, not negotiated when it has already arrived. Framed as grid modernisation, SM-011 extends to the connection allocation layer a transition already underway through frequency reserves, demand response, and priority load management.
Track 1 — Flexible loads: Standard connection process, priority access. A load qualifies as flexible if it commits to Fingrid's flexible connection agreement terms: acceptance of capacity limitation during defined stress periods, participation in reserve markets, or load shifting responsive to price signals. This definition is already in regulation (Energiavirasto flexible connection agreement rules, in force 1 February 2026).
Reserve market participation is operationally well-defined. Fingrid operates five reserve product categories, each with published technical requirements and prequalification processes: FFR (Fast Frequency Reserve, response within 0.5–2 s), FCR-N (Frequency Containment Reserve for Normal operation, symmetric ±0.1 Hz range), FCR-D (Frequency Containment Reserve for Disturbances, upward and downward products), aFRR (automatic Frequency Restoration Reserve), and mFRR (manual Frequency Restoration Reserve). CHP plants, industrial loads, electrolysers, and aggregated entities of smaller sites can all participate. A reserve income calculator is publicly available on Fingrid's website. Track 1 eligibility can be operationalised as: commitment to at least one reserve product agreement with Fingrid, or commitment to flexible connection agreement capacity limitation terms. This requires no new definition — the technical and contractual infrastructure is in place.
Track 2 — Inflexible loads: Capped annual quota per region, allocated via auction. A load is inflexible if it does not commit to flexible connection terms. Data centres with 24/7 flat profiles are the primary category. Within the quota, inflexible loads compete by price: bidders submit an annual premium per MW on the standard connection fee. The highest premium per MW secures the connection; the premium is paid annually and allocated to Fingrid's grid development fund. The auction clearing price is capped at the estimated avoided grid investment cost per MW — beyond that threshold, the connection is deferred to the next expansion phase rather than priced out of reach. This ceiling prevents strategic overbidding while preserving the incentive to offer flexibility instead.
The flexible connection agreement framework (Sähkömarkkinalaki §20b–20c, Energiavirasto rules effective 1 February 2026) already defines two categories: temporarily flexible (pending grid development) and permanently flexible (with Energiavirasto permit). An inflexible load is one that declines to enter either category.
No new definition is needed. The mechanism inverts the existing rule: flexible connection agreement = Track 1. No flexible connection agreement = Track 2. This is implementable through Fingrid's existing connection terms without legislative change.
The quota must be calibrated to avoid two failure modes:
Proposed approach: the quota is dynamic and regional, calibrated annually by Fingrid against three inputs:
Fingrid projects 200 MW of new connection capacity available in Southern Finland in 2027. Flexible load queue: 150 MW (industrial electrolysis, one SGFA-candidate CHP replacement, two industrial loads with reserve agreements). These receive connection priority. Remaining capacity: 50 MW.
Inflexible quota: 50 MW (25% of new capacity, after flexible queue served). Five data centres are queuing, each requesting 50–100 MW. They compete in an auction. Highest bidder secures the 50 MW connection. Auction proceeds (estimated €5–15M depending on competition) are directed to Fingrid's investment fund. The four unsuccessful bidders queue for next year's auction or reconsider offering flexibility.
Result: flexible loads are not displaced. Data centres pay for inflexibility. Grid investment is partially self-financing from inflexibility premium.
Initial calibration suggestion: 10–20% of new connection capacity per region allocated to inflexible quota. Review annually. Provide data centres with 3–5 year forward visibility on quota trajectory to support their investment planning.
| Element | Existing regulation | SM-011 addition |
|---|---|---|
| Flexible connection agreements | Sähkömarkkinalaki §20b–20c; Energiavirasto rules, 1 Feb 2026 | Used as Track 1/Track 2 dividing line — no new definition needed |
| Connection capacity constraints | Fingrid announcement (10 MW restriction to 2027) | Factual basis for the mechanism — constraint already exists |
| Fingrid's connection pricing authority | Sähkömarkkinalaki, Energiavirasto pricing guidelines | Auction operates within existing connection pricing framework |
| Inflexible quota cap | Not in regulation | New element — requires Fingrid board decision, not legislation |
| Auction mechanism | Not in regulation | New element — Fingrid board decision, with TEM guidance if needed |
| Proceeds to investment fund | Not formalised | New element — requires Fingrid board decision |
SM-011 does not require new legislation. The flexible connection agreement infrastructure is in place. The remaining elements — quota, auction, and proceeds allocation — are within Fingrid's operational and governance authority. TEM can reinforce through a non-binding recommendation without initiating a legislative process.
1. Fingrid board decision. Fingrid adopts a connection allocation policy that: (a) confirms flexible connection agreement commitment as the criterion for Track 1 priority; (b) establishes an annual inflexible quota per region; (c) implements a sealed-bid or ascending auction within the quota; (d) directs auction proceeds to a dedicated grid investment fund.
2. TEM guidance. TEM issues a recommendation supporting Fingrid's policy, signalling that inflexibility pricing is consistent with national energy policy objectives. No legislation required.
3. Transparency. Fingrid publishes annually: the quota by region, auction clearing prices, queue lengths by load category, and proceeds directed to investment. This creates market-facing accountability and allows data centre investors to plan.
4. Pilot year. Implement in one region (Southern Finland) for 2027, then evaluate before national rollout.
Liittymäkapasiteetin kohdentamisongelma on tunnistettu laajemmin: joustamattomat kuormat syrjäyttävät systemaattisesti joustavia liittyjiä, koska nykyinen prosessi ei hinnoittele joustavuutta. Tämä analyysi ehdottaa konkreettisen institutionaalisen vastauksen olemassa olevan sääntelyn varassa.
Säädettävät ja useita palveluja tuottavat kuormat — kaukolämpöä tuottava CHP-retrofit yhdistettynä reservimarkkinaosallistumiseen tai sähköpolttoainetuotantoon — ovat juuri se kapasiteettikerros, jonka liittyminen tuottaa sähköjärjestelmälle eniten arvoa. Nämä eivät saa joutua kilpailemaan 24/7-tasaisesta datakeskuskuormasta.
Sähköjärjestelmän kriittisin haavoittuvuus on olosuhteiden yhteisvaikutus: kylmä, tyyni ja kuiva sää yhtä aikaa laskevan kotimaisen varmatuotantokapasiteetin kanssa. Joustavuuskiintiö suojaa juuri ne kuormat, jotka kykenevät reagoimaan tällaisiin tilanteisiin.
SE1→FI-siirtoyhteyden reaaliaikainen käyttöaste (TRR) on luonteva dynaamisen kiintiön kalibrointiparametri: kun siirtokapasiteetti lähestyy saturaatiota, joustamaton kiintiö tiukkenee automaattisesti.
Track 1 -kelpoisuuden arvioinnissa voidaan hyödyntää mitattavia joustavuusindikaattoreita: reservimarkkinaosallistuminen, kysyntäjousto hintasignaaleihin ja hukkalämmön hyödyntäminen ovat konkreettisia kriteerejä, jotka Fingrid voi sisällyttää liittymissopimuksen ehtoihin.
SM-010 — Financing Instruments and Energy Clusters · WP-019 — SGFA Retrofit Pathways · WP-018 — Integration Quality Score · TN-009 — Compound Risk Analysis · WEM — Winter Endurance Monitor §12 · Sähkömarkkinalaki §20b–20c · Energiavirasto, Joustavat liittymissopimukset, 1 Feb 2026
Leskelä, Jukka (Energiateollisuus, toimitusjohtaja), Helsingin Sanomat 29.5.2026: "Kun sähkön kulutus kasvaa, se johtaa uusien tuulivoimainvestointien käynnistymiseen." "Säätövoiman riittävyys pakkastalvina on todellinen ongelma." [Sama artikkeli, ristiriitaiset lausumat.] Vastustaa datakeskuksille asetettavia erityisehtoja. Luottaa vapaaehtoisuuteen. Myöntää: Fingridillä ei ole mahdollisuutta asettaa liittymiä paremmuusjärjestykseen. — Lukijakommentti Geddala (HS 29.5.2026): "Ensi alkuun olisi läpinäkyvyyden vuoksi hyvä saada pöytään datakeskusten kanssa tehdyt sähkösopimukset. Kaikki verkon parantamisesta johtuvat kulut maksaa jokainen sähkönkäyttäjä yhteisesti." "Vahva epäilys on että Leskelä joutuu lähivuosina vastaamaan kiusallisiin kysymyksiin tässä jutussa antamistaan lausumista." Relevantti: SM-011 (liittymiskiintiö), SM-012 (siirtokustannusten sosialisointi), WP-015 (tuulivoiman kannibalisaatio vs. pakkastalven säätövaje).
Etelä-Korea / Distributed Energy Promotion Act 2024: Laki loi seitsemän alueellista "hajautetun energian erikoisvyöhykettä" joustavan liittymisen oikeudella, omalla hankintaviranomaisella ja teknologianeutraalilla kilpailutuksella. Tämä on SM-011:n kaksitasomallin (joustava vs. joustamaton käyttäjä) korealainen toteutus. Keskeinen ero: Korean malli vaatii lainsäädännön; SM-011:n ehdotus voidaan toteuttaa Fingridin hallituspäätöksellä ilman uutta lakia.
Norja / Statnett: Norjassa on käytössä eksplisiittinen kapasiteettijono teollisuuden verkkoon liittymiselle — etusijajärjestys perustuu jouston tarjoamiseen. Analogia SM-011:n Tier A / Tier B -jakoon. Ero: Norjassa vesivoima mahdollistaa suoran tasapainotuksen; Suomessa sama rakenne vaatii akkuvarastojen tai vetyelektrolyysin lisäämistä jouston lähteeksi.
SM-011:n auktiopohjainen kiintiömekanismi on se instrumentti joka ratkaisee TN-001:n avoimen Q-5-kysymyksen: onko kompensaatiokerroin C yli vai alle yhden kun julkinen investointi vetäytyy.
Reservisopimus joka hinnoitellaan palkitsemaan kestoa — maksamaan kapasiteetista joka seisoo käyttämättömänä kriisiin asti — muuntaa julkishyödykkeen yksityiseksi tulovirraksi. Sopimuksen hinta on se muuttuja joka liikuttaa C:tä.
"Duration capability" ei ole insinööriongelma — se on yksi hinnoittelupäätös Fingridissä jonka alavirtaa TN-001:n koko arkkitehtuuri on. SM-011 on se mekanismi jolla tämä päätös voidaan tehdä markkinalähtöisesti. Kytkentä: TN-001 Q-5