On the ten-year fiscal consequences of allocating 3 GW of zero-carbon Finnish electricity to SGFA-type domestic production versus foreign-owned data centre deployment
Energy allocation is fiscal policy. The decision of whether 3 GW of zero-carbon Finnish electricity powers domestic hydrogen and synthetic fuel production or foreign-owned data centres does not merely determine industrial composition — it determines the tax base, the trade balance, the direction of capital flows, and ultimately the fiscal space available for public services. This memo quantifies the ten-year difference: approximately 44 billion euros in societal value. The mechanism is not primarily about tax rates or corporate behaviour but about the structural position of the institutional layer that sits between physical electricity and economic value.
Finland has approximately 3 GW of zero-carbon electricity capacity that is, or will be, contested between several large-scale use cases. The publicly documented cases include: SGFA-type distributed green hydrogen and synthetic fuel production (electrolysis, Power-to-X, CCU chains), foreign-owned hyperscale data centres with 24/7 baseload demand, domestic industrial loads (Outokumpu, Neste, SSAB) seeking long-term price certainty, and offshore wind development seeking grid connection.
SM-011 analysed the allocation mechanism from a grid capacity and flexibility perspective. SM-012 analyses the same allocation decision from a fiscal sustainability perspective: what does each outcome imply for Finland's ability to fund public services, service sovereign debt, and maintain economic resilience over a ten-year horizon?
The question is not which option produces more global economic activity. It is which option produces more Finnish fiscal capacity — the precondition for the state to fulfil its functions.
CN-013 established that the same physical electricity produces radically different economic outcomes depending on the institutional layer through which it passes. The physical constraint (3 GW, 18 TWh/year) is identical across scenarios. What differs is who captures the value, where it is booked, and how much remains within the Finnish fiscal perimeter.
In the SGFA scenario, the entire value chain — electrolysis, compression, distribution, synthetic fuel synthesis, fertiliser production — involves Finnish entities subject to Finnish corporate taxation, Finnish employees subject to Finnish payroll taxation, and Finnish consumers paying Finnish VAT. The institutional layer retains value domestically.
In the data centre scenario, the Finnish subsidiary typically books only a thin operating margin (empirically 1–3% in comparable transfer pricing structures), while the service revenue — generated by international cloud computing, AI inference, and storage — is booked in low-tax jurisdictions (Ireland, Luxembourg). The institutional layer exports value. The Finnish fiscal perimeter captures the electricity cost, the employment cost, and a thin margin, while the bulk of value flows to the parent entity.
Energy allocation is not an energy policy question. It is an institutional design question. The same electrons produce different fiscal outcomes depending on which institutional structure they enter. Finland controls the allocation decision; it does not control the institutional structure of the entities that receive the allocation.
Based on hydrogen production at 4.2 €/kg (378,000 t H2/year at 70% electrolysis efficiency) and synthetic fuel production at 2.1 €/litre (CCU/PtL chain), combined with the full domestic value chain:
| Fiscal item | Basis | M€/year |
|---|---|---|
| Corporate tax | Revenue × 12% margin × 20% rate | 38 |
| VAT | Revenue × 30% consumer share × 24% | 114 |
| Payroll taxes | 8,750 jobs × 75,000 € × 30% | 197 |
| Tax revenue total | 349 | |
| Unemployment benefit saving | 3,500 new jobs × 18,000 €/year | 6 |
| State subsidy required | No dedicated programme needed | 0 |
| Net fiscal contribution | 356 | |
| Trade balance improvement | Import substitution (LNG/diesel) 18 TWh × 70% × 180 €/MWh | 2,268 |
| Capital outflow | 0 |
Based on hyperscale colocation economics (60 €/kW/month service revenue to Finnish entity), with transfer pricing reducing the Finnish subsidiary margin to approximately 2%:
| Fiscal item | Basis | M€/year |
|---|---|---|
| Corporate tax | Colo revenue × 2% margin × 20% rate | 9 |
| VAT | Business input, largely recovered | 0 |
| Payroll taxes | 1,000 jobs × 85,000 € × 30% | 26 |
| Reduced energy tax | 18 TWh × 2.2 €/MWh (industrial rate) | 40 |
| Tax revenue total | 74 | |
| State subsidy paid | Government 10-year tax rebate programme (Dec 2025) | −30 |
| Net fiscal contribution | 46 | |
| Trade balance effect | No import substitution | 0 |
| Capital outflow (profit repatriation) | Global IT service value × 25% margin to parent | 1,800 |
The annual fiscal difference between the two scenarios is 310 M€/year in direct fiscal contribution (356 vs 46 M€/year). Adding the trade balance effect (2,268 M€/year import substitution in SGFA) and the capital outflow (1,800 M€/year leaving Finland in the DC scenario), the total annual difference in Finnish economic position is approximately 4,378 M€/year.
Note that the DC scenario also involves the state paying 30 M€/year in subsidies to the arrangement — effectively paying for a fiscal outcome that is worse than the alternative by 310 M€/year in direct terms.
| Metric | SGFA (10y) | DC (10y) | Difference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tax revenue to Finland (Mrd €) | 3.5 | 0.7 | +2.8 |
| State subsidies paid (Mrd €) | 0 | 0.3 | +0.3 |
| Net fiscal contribution (Mrd €) | 3.6 | 0.5 | +3.1 |
| Trade balance improvement (Mrd €) | 22.7 | 0 | +22.7 |
| Capital outflow to parent entities (Mrd €) | 0 | 18.0 | +18.0 |
| Total Finnish economic position (Mrd €) | +26.3 | −17.5 | +43.8 |
The 44 billion euro difference over ten years from a single 3 GW allocation decision is not an argument that data centres produce no value. They produce significant global value. The question is where that value lands — and the answer depends entirely on the institutional layer, not on the technology.
The SGFA scenario produces approximately 3.5 billion euros in tax revenue over ten years that the DC scenario does not. In the context of Finland's 2026 fiscal position — approximately 2.5 billion euro annual deficit, interest costs rising toward 6.3 billion by 2030 (SM-001 §04) — this difference is material. It represents one year of additional deficit service capacity, or approximately 15% of the annual healthcare budget.
More significantly, the 22.7 billion euro trade balance improvement in the SGFA scenario directly reduces Finland's external financing requirement. A country that produces its own transport fuel needs fewer euros to buy it from abroad. This reduces the current account deficit and the structural pressure on sovereign debt accumulation.
The data centre fiscal outcome is not produced by any individual firm acting improperly. Transfer pricing between a Finnish subsidiary and an Irish or Luxembourg parent is legal, common, and entirely rational from the parent's perspective. The problem is structural: Finland's regulatory framework does not require that the fiscal value generated by Finnish electricity, Finnish grid infrastructure, and Finnish grid stability services be retained within the Finnish fiscal perimeter.
This is the same mechanism that SM-011 identifies in the grid connection context and CN-013 identifies in the spatial value capture context. The physical layer (electricity, grid capacity, hydrological endurance) is Finnish. The institutional layer (corporate structure, tax jurisdiction, transfer pricing) is designed elsewhere. Value flows through the institutional layer outward.
Outokumpu CEO ter Horst stated in May 2026: "The question is what is the price of industrial electricity in 20 years — we need to see that investment environment." This is the long-horizon version of the same question: if the institutional layer that surrounds Finnish electricity is systematically designed to export fiscal value, the price of Finnish electricity in 20 years will reflect a tax base that has been progressively hollowed out to fund the public services that make Finland an attractive location for industry.
Energy allocation is a fiscal policy decision with a ten-year consequence. The mechanism that produces the 44 billion euro difference is not electricity pricing or corporate taxation — it is the institutional layer that sits between the physical resource and the economic value. Finland controls the allocation decision. It does not automatically control the institutional layer. Making the two consistent requires explicit policy: mechanisms that ensure that entities receiving Finnish electricity capacity contribute proportionally to the Finnish fiscal perimeter that makes that capacity possible.
SM-011 proposes one such mechanism (flexibility quota and auction). The fiscal analysis in this memo provides the quantitative basis for why such mechanisms are warranted: the current default produces a fiscal outcome that is structurally inferior to the alternative by an amount sufficient to materially affect Finland's long-term fiscal sustainability.
The estimates in §03–04 are based on publicly available price data (hydrogen 4.2 €/kg, SAF 2.1 €/litre, colocation 60 €/kW/month) and standard Finnish tax rates. Key sensitivities:
The 44 billion euro ten-year figure is robust to moderate variation in any single parameter. It is sensitive to the fundamental assumption that DC transfer pricing maintains the thin-margin subsidiary structure. If regulatory change forced full profit booking in Finland, the DC fiscal outcome would improve substantially — but this would require the same institutional design change that this memo argues is currently absent.
Scenarios A and B in §03–04 compare two endpoints. The more useful question is how a 3 GW / 26.3 TWh electricity budget should be allocated across products to maximise fiscal stability — not peak return in a single scenario.
The core finding from portfolio analysis: SGFA does not maximise energy value. It maximises tax base diversification per TWh. Different products carry different market cycles — food (stable), fuels (cyclical), compute (globally growing), grid services (weather-dependent). Correlation between revenue streams is low. This is the structural advantage, not efficiency per MWh.
| Kohdistus | Osuus | TWh/v | M€/TWh | M€/v (arvio) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proteiinisynteesi (Solar Foods -tyyppi) | 30 % | 7.9 | 60–120 | 470–950 |
| Vety + e-polttoaineet (PtX) | 35 % | 9.2 | 40–80 | 370–740 |
| Datakeskukset (Heikura-kalibroitu) | 20 % | 5.3 | 8–15 | 40–80 |
| FCR + verkon jousto | 10 % | 2.6 | ~4 | ~10 |
| Yhteensä | 100 % | 25.0 | — | 890–1780 |
After subsidy costs (PtX support −150–250 M€, DC incentives −50–100 M€), net state cash flow is approximately 0.9–1.2 B€/year — compared to the 0–200 M€ range from single-product allocation.
The difference does not come from efficiency. It comes from breaking correlation between revenue streams.
The portfolio model assumes CO-route thermochemical conversion (TN-013) as part of the PtX block. A critical input parameter: Finland does not face a biogenic CO₂ supply constraint. Pulp mills, sawmills and CHP plants produce biogenic CO₂ as a continuous byproduct. This material has historically had no commercial value and has been vented or used in minimal internal applications.
This is a structural advantage that does not appear in standard CCU cost models, which typically assume either direct air capture (expensive) or industrial point sources with competing claims. In Finland's case:
A second supply layer reinforces this advantage: Finnish municipal energy companies (kunnalliset energialaitokset) produce electricity and district heating predominantly from wood-based fuels. These plants are geographically distributed across exactly the same regions as viable SGFA node locations — Kuopio, Joensuu, Kajaani, Kokkola, Rovaniemi and others. Their biogenic CO₂ output is continuous, co-located with existing heat and power infrastructure, and currently has no utilisation pathway.
This means the Finnish biogenic CO₂ supply base is not concentrated in a handful of large industrial point sources but distributed across dozens of municipal CHP plants — a logistics advantage that further reduces SGFA node feedstock cost and removes single-source dependency risk.
This makes the Finnish PtX block in the portfolio structurally less subsidy-dependent than equivalent calculations for Central European or UK nodes, where biogenic CO₂ must be specifically sourced or replaced with DAC.
In May 2026, three senior Finnish voices addressed the data centre question in public. Their statements are reproduced here not as criticism but as empirical documentation of the analytical gap this memo addresses.
| Speaker | Statement (May 2026) | What it omits |
|---|---|---|
| Jukka Leskelä CEO, Energiateollisuus ry MTV, 7.5.2026 |
"Se, että tätä on nyt yli vuoden ajan veivattu edestakaisin, eikä vieläkään saada valmista, on tietysti erittäin huono signaali Suomesta investointiympäristönä maailmalle." | Leskelä is correct that policy instability is a negative signal. He does not address whether the investment being signalled is optimal from a fiscal perspective. Energiateollisuus members benefit from data centre electricity consumption regardless of the fiscal outcome for the state. |
| Antti Poikola Executive Director, FDCA Asian ytimessä, 11.5.2026 |
"Markkinat ovat hoitaneet sen erittäin hyvin. Suomessa on erittäin hyvin toimivat sähkömarkkinat. Meillä on Euroopan kolmanneksi halvinta sähköä tarjolla kuluttajille." | Poikola is correct that electricity markets function and prices are currently low. He does not address the fiscal value retention question: how much of the value generated by Finnish electricity, grid infrastructure, and grid stability services is retained in the Finnish fiscal perimeter. |
| Sari Multala Minister of Environment and Energy Kaleva, 16.5.2026 |
"Monet muut hankkeet eivät ole investointikypsiä, mutta datakeskukset tällä hetkellä ovat." / "Vireillä on suunnitelmia, joissa datakeskukset kantavat osansa vastuusta." | The minister correctly notes that data centres are currently investment-ready while alternatives are not. She does not address why alternatives are not investment-ready — the answer is partly that data centres have received preferential allocation of grid capacity, permitting priority, and subsidy design. "Suunnitelmia" (plans) for responsibility-sharing is not a mechanism. SM-011 proposes the mechanism. |
All three speakers address the same question — are data centres good for Finland? — from the perspective of investment flow, market function, and policy process. None addresses the fiscal value retention question: of the economic value generated by Finnish electricity, what fraction remains in the Finnish fiscal perimeter, and how does this compare to the alternative uses of the same electricity?
This is not a criticism of any individual position. It is an observation that the public discourse in May 2026 lacks the analytical variable that SM-012 introduces: net fiscal contribution per MWh allocated, measured over a ten-year horizon.
The statement "datakeskukset kantavat osansa vastuusta" will produce different outcomes depending on whether "osansa" is defined by voluntary plans or by the mandatory mechanism proposed in SM-011. The difference between these two is approximately 275 M€/year in fiscal contribution to Finland.
Nøland, Jonas Kristiansen (2026): Tuulivoimakritiikki, Affärsvärlden-kolumni. NTNU energiatekniikan professori. Keskeiset havainnot: kannibalisaatioilmiö (tuulivoima alentaa hintaa eniten juuri silloin kun tuottaa eniten), arvottomuusuhka 2035 mennessä, maantieteellinen keskittyminen + siirtokapasiteetin rajallisuus rakenteellisina ongelmina. BCG-tuki: tuottajat saavat vain puolet sähkön markkinahinnasta. Valtion tuki vanhoille tuulivoimaloille 210 M€ vuonna 2025. Linjassa ACI WP-015 elastisuuden romahdus -analyysin ja SM-012 Heikura-rakenteen kanssa.
Leskelä, Jukka (Energiateollisuus, toimitusjohtaja), Helsingin Sanomat 29.5.2026: "Kun sähkön kulutus kasvaa, se johtaa uusien tuulivoimainvestointien käynnistymiseen." "Säätövoiman riittävyys pakkastalvina on todellinen ongelma." [Sama artikkeli, ristiriitaiset lausumat.] Vastustaa datakeskuksille asetettavia erityisehtoja. Luottaa vapaaehtoisuuteen. Myöntää: Fingridillä ei ole mahdollisuutta asettaa liittymiä paremmuusjärjestykseen. — Lukijakommentti Geddala (HS 29.5.2026): "Ensi alkuun olisi läpinäkyvyyden vuoksi hyvä saada pöytään datakeskusten kanssa tehdyt sähkösopimukset. Kaikki verkon parantamisesta johtuvat kulut maksaa jokainen sähkönkäyttäjä yhteisesti." "Vahva epäilys on että Leskelä joutuu lähivuosina vastaamaan kiusallisiin kysymyksiin tässä jutussa antamistaan lausumista." Relevantti: SM-011 (liittymiskiintiö), SM-012 (siirtokustannusten sosialisointi), WP-015 (tuulivoiman kannibalisaatio vs. pakkastalven säätövaje).
Saravirta, Pihla, Helsingin Sanomat 29.5.2026: "Kokkolan alumiinitehdas nielisi 10 prosenttia Suomen sähköstä." Arctial (Rio Tinto, Mitsubishi, Fortum, ABB, Siemens Financial Services): 610 000 t/v alumiinia, 9 TWh kulutus, 4,7 mrd EUR investointi, päätös 2026, tuotanto 2030.
Heikkilä, Mikko (Fingrid, yhteiskuntasuhteiden päällikkö): "Lisääntynyt kysyntä toki lähtökohtaisesti nostaa hintoja, mutta se mahdollistaa myös uutta sähköntuotantoa." — Tautologinen rakenne: kysyntä mahdollistaa tarjonnan, mutta kapasiteettimekanismi puuttuu. Sama logiikka kuin Leskelä-lausunto 29.5.2026. "Suomessa on hyvät mahdollisuudet tuottaa sähköä tämä tarvittu määrä ja paljon enemmänkin." — Ei aikataulua, ei mekanismia, ei vastuutahoa.
Hurskainen, Petri (lukijakommentti, HS 29.5.2026): "Ongelmahan ei ole se, mihin sähkön hinta asettuu vaikka 10 vuoden päästä. Vaan tämä ajanjakso välissä, jossa kulutus kasvaa rajusti eivätkä sähkön tuotanto investoinnit pysy perässä." — Täsmälleen WEM:n mittaama transitiojakson haavoittuvuus. Relevanssi SM-012:lle: alumiinitehdas on §06 portfolio-analyysin mukainen (kotimainen arvonlisä, strateginen raaka-aine, 10x enemmän työpaikkoja kuin datakeskus / TWh) — oikea laiva oikeaan satamaan. Ongelma: kapasiteettimekanismi puuttuu edelleen. Julkinen epäluottamus Fingridin kapasiteettilupauksia kohtaan kasvaa — SM-007 Convergence Finding -rakennetta tukevaa empiiristä aineistoa.
Saksa / IPCEI H2: €5,4 mrd, 35 kumppania, 15 maata. Klusterimalli joka kattaa koko arvoketjun — vastaa SM-012:n biogeeninen CO₂ + PtX + proteini -portfoliologiikkaa. Rajoite: IPCEI-mittakaava vaatii rajat ylittävää merkitystä; kansallinen pienklusteritaso ei kelpaa. Oppi: portfolio-allokaatio vaatii eri rahoitusinstrumentin eri mittakaavoille.
Kiina / Yancheng Dafeng Port Zero-Carbon Industrial Park: tuulivoima + aurinko + vety integroitu teräs- ja paperitehtaisiin suljetussa kierrossa. Biogeenisen CO₂:n ja CCU:n analogia SM-012 §05:ssä. Erona: Kiinan malli toimii pakollisella osallistumisella, suomalainen vapaaehtoisella aggregoinnilla (TN-018 AAP).
Japani / JH2A 525 yritystä: Sama portfolio-diversifikaatioajatus kuin SM-012:n 3 GW jakaumassa — vety, PtX, datakeskukset, FCR eri osuuksilla. JH2A:n kokemus: diversifioitu portfolio vaatii koordinoivan institutionaalisen rakenteen. Ilman sitä jokainen sektori optimoi erikseen (TN-017:n aggregator gap).
The ten-year fiscal gap of approximately 44 billion euros rests on a set of structural assumptions. This section presents the parameter space and confidence range for that estimate.
Base case parameters:
Note: the 44 billion figure is the undiscounted ten-year cumulative gap, not the net present value. The NPV at 3.5% discount rate is approximately 25.7 billion euros. Both figures are cited in different contexts — the distinction matters when comparing across documents.
Sensitivity table (annual gap, M€/year):
| Parameter variation | Low estimate | Base case | High estimate |
|---|---|---|---|
| Transfer pricing margin (1% / 2% / 4%) | +18 | +46 | +74 |
| Capital repatriation rate (15% / 25% / 35%) | 245 | 310 | 380 |
| SGFA job creation (6,000 / 8,750 / 12,000) | 285 | 310 | 345 |
| PPA volume (2 GW / 3 GW / 4 GW) | 207 | 310 | 414 |
| Tax rebate programme (0 / −30 / −60 M€/y) | 340 | 310 | 280 |
Combined scenario range:
Key parameter: capital repatriation. The single most influential variable is the assumed rate of profit repatriation from Finnish data centre subsidiaries to parent entities. The base case (25% of global IT service margin) is derived from publicly disclosed transfer pricing structures of major hyperscalers in comparable jurisdictions (Ireland, Netherlands). If Finnish subsidiaries negotiate higher local margins (1–2% range), the gap narrows substantially. If repatriation rates reflect the Irish precedent (30–35%), the gap widens.
What the sensitivity analysis does not change: Across all plausible parameter combinations, the directional finding holds — SGFA-type domestic value chains generate substantially higher fiscal retention than foreign-owned hyperscale data centres at equivalent electricity consumption. The 44 billion figure is a central estimate; the range is 26–64 billion over ten years. A critic who disputes the exact figure does not thereby dispute the structural direction of the finding.
Cross-reference: CN-024 §02 cites the 44 billion euro estimate as the fiscal basis for the PPA allocation argument. The sensitivity range above applies equally to that reference.