A closed-loop model for the Gulf of Bothnia — domestic fuel moving domestic cargo on domestic routes, and the coordination gap preventing it
Two independent development pathways in the Gulf of Bothnia region are structurally complementary but operationally disconnected. The first is energy: the Laanila SGFA node in Oulu (P2X Solutions, 100 MW electrolysis) produces green hydrogen and e-methane from renewable electricity and biogenic CO₂. The second is logistics: the industrial base of northern Finland and northern Sweden requires reliable, cost-effective freight connections to Central European markets. The routes currently available — primarily operated by Dutch and Italian-owned carriers — do not provide direct, scheduled service from the Gulf of Bothnia to major Central European ports. This paper documents the structural complementarity between these pathways, quantifies the emissions and economic case for integration, identifies the coordination failure that prevents it, and proposes a four-phase action model. The analysis draws on long-form operational knowledge of Nordic maritime logistics — including RoRo operations, huckepack systems, and the historical Transfennica Antwerp–Rauma/Kemi routes — as well as the ACI diagnostic framework developed in SM-009, SM-010, and WP-019.
The Laanila industrial area in Oulu hosts one of Finland's most advanced concentrations of energy infrastructure. The existing biovoimalaitos produces 70 MW electricity and 175 MW heat. Sähkökattilat capacity of 100 MW (Laanila 40 MW + Toppila 60 MW) provides additional flexibility. P2X Solutions, in cooperation with Oulun Energia, has been preparing a 100 MW electrolysis unit with CO₂ capture since at least 2023; the YVA process was initiated in November 2024. Gasum operates a 35 GWh/year biogas plant and an LNG/LBG fuelling station at the site. Fingrid's planned 400 kV Järnväg reinforcement (Oulu–Lappeenranta) is scheduled for completion before 2035.
The investment decision for the electrolysis unit, expected in autumn 2025, had not been confirmed as of May 2026. The primary constraint is coordination between the electrolysis investment and the Fingrid FCR-D reserve market contract that would anchor the project's revenue model. This is a documented instance of the coordination failure pattern in WP-019 §3: technically ready, economically viable, institutionally stalled.
The industrial base of northern Finland — forest industry, metals, machinery — and the accelerating industrial development of northern Sweden (Stegra 700 MW electrolysis, HYBRIT, LKAB expansion) generate substantial and growing freight volumes requiring efficient connections to Central European markets. The current RoRo carrier landscape in Finland is almost entirely foreign-owned:
| Operator | Route | Ownership | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Finnlines | Helsinki–Travemünde and others | Grimaldi Group (Italian) | Focused on southern Finland |
| Transfennica | Formerly Antwerp–Rauma/Kemi; now southern only | Spliethoff (Dutch) | Northern routes discontinued |
| Wallenius SOL | Northern Europe | Wallenius Lines (Swedish) | South Enabler methanol-ready (delivered June 2025) |
| Wagenborg | Kaskinen–Travemünde | Wagenborg (Dutch) | Opened June 2025 |
The structural gap is a direct, scheduled RoRo service from the Gulf of Bothnia (Oulu, Kemi) to major Central European ports (Antwerp, Rotterdam). Freight currently routes via southern Finnish ports, adding transit time, cost, and emissions. Traficom's 2025 port-freight survey confirms this pattern empirically: road departures from ports were concentrated in southern Finland in 2023, and Hanko specifically distributes import cargo nationwide, including to northern destinations. The discontinued Transfennica Antwerp–Rauma/Kemi route — which served the Gulf of Bothnia for decades as part of a huckepack and intermodal system connecting Finnish industry to continental rail networks — represented precisely this connectivity, and its withdrawal removed a service that had genuine industrial anchoring.
The RoRo and combined transport systems that served northern Finland in earlier decades — including huckepack (rail-road piggyback), railship services, and the Transfennica Antwerp–Rauma/Kemi route — were built around industrial volume commitments that made the routes commercially viable. Their gradual withdrawal reflects the same coordination failure that ACI documents across energy and digital infrastructure: no single actor owns the systemic value of the connection, so each actor individually optimises away from maintaining it. The routes existed when there was a party willing to take the system view. They disappear when that party exits.
Finland's maritime freight connections to Central Europe are predominantly operated by foreign-owned carriers: Grimaldi (Italian), Spliethoff (Dutch), Wallenius Lines (Swedish), Wagenborg (Dutch). In road and logistics services, the 2025 acquisition of DB Schenker by DSV (Danish, 14.3 billion euros) created a further concentration of critical logistics infrastructure under non-Finnish ownership. DHL — part of Deutsche Post DHL Group (German) — controls another major segment.
This is structurally analogous to the digital infrastructure dependency documented in SM-010 §09: critical operational infrastructure under foreign jurisdiction, with decision-making authority located outside Finland. In a crisis scenario, carriers can redeploy vessels to other routes. DSV or DHL can prioritise other markets. Finland has no domestic operators that could substitute at scale for Gulf of Bothnia–Central Europe freight. The security-of-supply implications of this ownership concentration do not appear to have been systematically quantified in the public material reviewed for this paper, in the same way that no systematic quantification appears in the public material reviewed for the digital infrastructure dependency documented in SM-010 §09.
The coordination failure described throughout this paper is not limited to the gap between separate companies or agencies. A pattern reported to ACI, understood to be a recognised type of inefficiency in the freight forwarding industry generally rather than a claim about any specific, named operator: two traffic coordinators within the same freight forwarding company, one responsible for German traffic and one for Dutch traffic, each independently dispatched an empty trailer toward the other's side of the border — one to Lübeck, one to a point near the Ruhr only a few dozen kilometres away, where the first unit had already unloaded across the border. Neither coordinator had visibility of the other's flow. This illustrates, at firm level, the same structural condition WP-020 documents at system level: each actor optimises the segment it can see, and no actor owns the view required to see the redundancy. Foreign ownership concentration (above) determines who holds that view; this example shows that even shared ownership does not guarantee it exists.
A directly relevant precedent exists for the Helsinki–Oulu corridor specifically, separate from the Transfennica sea route: combined rail-truck (huckepack) transport operated between Helsinki-Pasila and Oulu into the 1990s, discontinued in 2014 per official sources citing "weakened demand" and poor profitability. Operational experience raised a question about whether historical rail-versus-road price comparisons on this corridor fully reflected the underlying cost structure: historical operational material indicates that the internal accounting treatment of the rail component and an externally quoted market price did not necessarily produce the same price signal. The observation is used here only to motivate a competitive test; it is not presented as evidence of improper pricing, subsidy, or misconduct by any operator, named or unnamed, and it does not by itself establish the competitiveness or non-competitiveness of any specific current operator.
The official record ("demand weakened") and the operational question raised above (whether the price signal fully reflected the underlying cost structure) describe the same withdrawal differently, and the paper's purpose is not to adjudicate between them for any named operator. This matters for any current or future relaunch proposal on this corridor, at whatever stated viability threshold (vehicles or trailers per weekday) and transit time is proposed: before a modal-shift claim is treated as evidence for the synergy case, the price an independent, non-affiliated shipper would actually be quoted should be obtained and compared against current road rates, under open competitive conditions rather than any single operator's internal accounting. The historical question shows that apparent rail viability — in either direction — can be a pricing artefact rather than a real cost signal; the same test has not yet been run for any current proposal. Rather than treating operational experience as evidence of either competitiveness or non-competitiveness, this paper proposes an open market test as the appropriate next step.
§1.4 risks collapsing into a narrower question than it should — "is a particular operator's huckepack service viable?" — when the actual question this paper needs to answer is broader: is a competitive intermodal service on the Helsinki–Oulu axis possible at all, under some operator and pricing structure, and if so, which one? The infrastructure is fixed; the business model is not. The relevant counterfactual is therefore not "incumbent operator versus road" but "competitive intermodal service versus road." Any single operator's pricing history — distorted or not — does not, by itself, establish that intermodal transport on this corridor is structurally uncompetitive against road under every possible operator and cost structure.
The question decomposes into six separable layers, each of which can vary independently:
| Layer | Current default | Alternatives |
|---|---|---|
| Infrastructure | State rail network, existing terminals | Fixed regardless of operator |
| Operator | Incumbent national rail freight operator | Any licensed rail freight operator (market opened to competition in 2007); a new entrant |
| Service organiser | Vertically integrated with the rail operator | Independent forwarder/logistics operator (huolintaliike) contracting rail capacity separately from road |
| Rolling stock | Operator-owned wagons | Leased or third-party-owned pocket wagons/trailers |
| Pricing | Internal transfer price or a single operator's own commercial quote | Arm's-length, competitively tendered rate |
| Anchor demand | Not yet secured | Industrial shipper consortium (cf. Metsä Group, Stora Enso anchor tenant model in §04 Phase 1) |
Reframed this way, the relevant policy question is not "should the incumbent open huckepack" but: under what operator and terminal model would an intermodal Helsinki–Oulu service be competitive, and what would it cost an independent shipper? A concrete test format follows directly: an open market-dialogue or competitive-tender exercise — Helsinki/Vuosaari–Oulu, 20 combination vehicles or 30 trailers per weekday each direction — inviting any interested operator to quote €/trailer, transit time, and reliability to an independent shipper. This produces, for the first time, a genuinely comparable figure: intermodal €/trailer versus road €/trailer, set by competition rather than by one operator's internal accounting. The purpose of such a test is therefore not to prove that rail is cheaper than road; it is to determine whether the current market structure has ever allowed the relevant intermodal service to be priced competitively. Only after that comparison exists can the modal-shift claim in §2.2b be treated as tested rather than assumed.
Operator is an endogenous variable. The route's economic and social viability should be measured first, independently of who eventually provides the service. This follows the same principle SM-009 applies elsewhere in the ACI framework: do not optimise the organisation, optimise the system outcome. A paper that appears to argue either "the incumbent should open huckepack" or "the incumbent's huckepack is uncompetitive" has answered the wrong question; the right question is whether the corridor supports a competitive intermodal service under some achievable operator and pricing structure, tested openly rather than assumed from one operator's history.
The structural complementarity between the Laanila energy node and a Gulf of Bothnia logistics hub is straightforward. Laanila produces hydrogen and e-methane from renewable electricity and biogenic CO₂. A logistics hub at or near Oulu port provides storage, distribution, and fuelling infrastructure. The fuel moves domestic cargo on routes that connect domestic industry to European markets. The loop closes: domestic renewable energy powers domestic freight.
The specific fuel pathways are:
Heavy road transport: Hydrogen fuel cell or hydrogen combustion engines provide 600–1000 km range under cold conditions — addressing the primary operational constraint of battery-electric trucks in Finnish winter logistics. A 100 MW electrolyser produces approximately 40,000 kg hydrogen per day under optimistic operating assumptions, sufficient for roughly 200 heavy vehicles at 200 km daily range.
Short-sea shipping: Methanol-ready RoRo vessels — such as Wallenius SOL's South Enabler, delivered June 2025 — can be fuelled with e-methane or methanol produced from the electrolysis output. The infrastructure for methane liquefaction at the hub is an incremental addition to existing LNG/LBG infrastructure at Laanila.
Port and terminal equipment: Battery-electric container cranes, terminal tractors, and handling equipment are commercially available and represent the lowest-complexity electrification pathway.
A 100 MW electrolyser producing 40,000 kg hydrogen per day, substituting diesel in heavy transport: 1 kg hydrogen replaces approximately 3.5 litres diesel. CO₂ saving: approximately 10 kg CO₂ per kg hydrogen (diesel at 2.7 kg CO₂/litre × 3.5 litres). Annual saving at full operation: 40,000 kg/day × 365 days × 10 kg CO₂ = approximately 146,000 tonnes CO₂ per year. This represents approximately 2.4% of Finland's total heavy transport CO₂ emissions (6.2 million tonnes per year).
A separate, route-specific emissions comparison — independent of the hydrogen substitution case above — applies ISO 14083 / CountEmissionsEU reference coefficients (road: 0.12 kg CO₂e/tkm; short-sea: 0.03 kg CO₂e/tkm generic, adjusted to 0.045 kg CO₂e/tkm for ice-class Baltic vessels) to two competing routings for Antwerp/Lübeck-origin full-load cargo destined for northern Finland:
| Routing | Sea leg | Road leg | kg CO₂e/tonne (ice-class adjusted) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Via Helsinki + domestic road to Oulu | ~1,600 km | ~600 km | 144.0 |
| Direct RoRo to Kemi + local delivery | ~2,200 km | ~30 km | 102.6 |
Result: 29% lower emissions per tonne via direct Gulf of Bothnia routing, even under the conservative ice-class-adjusted coefficient (42% lower under the generic short-sea coefficient). This is additive to, not overlapping with, the hydrogen-substitution case in §2.2: the route-choice saving applies to any vessel fuel type, while the hydrogen case applies specifically to the fuel used on that vessel or on the connecting road leg.
Diverting full-load cargo from the domestic VT4 road corridor (Helsinki–Oulu–Kemi) to a direct sea route carries externalities beyond emissions. National heavy-vehicle-accident statistics (Liikenneturva, 2016–2025) show 47 deaths and 340 injuries per year on average in accidents involving a truck or bus — over one-quarter of all Finnish road deaths — of which three in four fatalities are occupants of the other vehicle, not the heavy vehicle itself. Reducing heavy-vehicle volume on VT4 therefore disproportionately reduces third-party risk rather than risk to the freight operation itself. Separately, the Iin ohikulkutie project — built specifically to address a VT4 heavy-traffic bottleneck (1,030–1,260 heavy vehicles/day, 8–13% of total traffic) — was assessed at a benefit-cost ratio of 0.33, comparable in weakness to other Finnish infrastructure cases in this class (cf. Itärata, 0.13–0.15). This suggests the current road-corridor paradigm — building capacity to accommodate heavy freight rather than diverting it — is not obviously the stronger economic case on this corridor either.
§2.1 identifies hydrogen as the primary pathway for heavy road transport under cold-weather range constraints. A complementary, nearer-term pathway exists for the terminal's onward regional distribution specifically, using battery-electric trucks rather than hydrogen: Kesko has already deployed this exact model, building heavy-vehicle charging infrastructure at its Kempele terminal (adjacent to Oulu) to feed ~65 daily loads across Northern Ostrobothnia and Lapland — a regional distribution radius of typically under 150 km per leg. Kesko's own fleet plan scales from ~40 electric heavy/light commercial vehicles nationally (2025) to 70 (2026) and 200 (2030). A directly comparable industrial precedent — UPM's ~200-tonne electric wood-chip combination at Pietarsaari, operating a short, fixed port-adjacent route — achieves a measured 94% CO₂e reduction per tonne-km versus its diesel predecessor. The binding national constraint is trunk-route charging infrastructure ("olematon" — non-existent — per industry sources, with only ~250 electric heavy trucks registered nationally, fewer than 50 with trailers); a terminal- or port-based charging hub does not require this trunk network, since it serves a fixed point with a bounded regional radius rather than long-haul corridor transit. Oulu port's own OuluZone port-automation programme already includes charging-infrastructure expansion as part of its scope, indicating institutional alignment rather than a new proposal.
The option value of domestic fuel production — the security-of-supply premium that market pricing systematically omits — is documented in WP-019 §8 at 90–120 million euros per TWh produced. The empirical reference is the March 2026 Hormuz disruption: TTF gas prices rose from 30 to 53 euros per MWh, at which point domestic biogas and e-methane production at 35–45 euros per MWh was competitive precisely when it was needed. The regional multiplier from fully energy-autonomous production — based on Ruralia Institute calculations for comparable Finnish municipalities — runs at 11–14 million euros per year per node in indirect economic circulation.
The logistics connectivity adds a second economic layer. The absence of direct Gulf of Bothnia–Central Europe RoRo service represents a continuous cost imposed on northern Finnish industry: longer transit times, higher per-unit costs, and increased emissions from southern routing. Quantifying this requires anchor tenant volume commitments from industrial actors — the precondition for any carrier to consider route establishment.
The complementarity between the energy and logistics pathways is visible. The investment case for each, independently, is documented. EU funding instruments — CEF (Connecting Europe Facility), Innovation Fund, REPowerEU — are available and have funded comparable projects elsewhere. Yet as of May 2026, neither pathway has reached an investment decision, and no actor has assumed coordination responsibility for the integrated system.
The SM-009 three-gap diagnostic applies directly.
The measurement gap: the combined value of energy-logistics integration — reduced transit costs, domestic fuel revenue, option value, regional multiplier, emissions reduction, security-of-supply improvement — does not appear to be calculated in the planning documents reviewed for this paper. The energy project is evaluated on energy criteria. The logistics gap is noted but not quantified. The integration case does not appear in the official assessments reviewed, which is consistent with no institution being tasked with producing it.
The sanction gap: the Laanila investment decision delay carries no apparent political cost. The absence of Gulf of Bothnia–Central Europe RoRo service carries no apparent political cost. The DSV/Grimaldi/Spliethoff ownership concentration in Finnish freight logistics does not appear to have been assessed as a security-of-supply risk in the public parliamentary and HVK material reviewed for this paper.
The correction gap: without measurement and without sanction, correction will not occur before a forcing event. The most likely forcing events are a major Baltic Sea shipping disruption (weather, conflict, infrastructure failure) or an energy price shock severe enough to make domestic fuel production immediately commercially attractive without subsidy. Both scenarios are more expensive correction mechanisms than proactive coordination.
The energy pathway and the logistics pathway have different owners, different funding sources, different regulatory frameworks, and different institutional champions. No existing body has a mandate to evaluate their combined value or to coordinate their development timelines. This is not a failure of individual actors — P2X Solutions, Oulun Energia, Oulun satama, and the relevant carriers are all competent organisations pursuing their separate objectives rationally. The failure is that the system has no actor responsible for the systemic outcome. This is the central finding of SM-009, applied here to a specific regional case.
Establish contact with Wallenius SOL and Wagenborg regarding conditions for a scheduled Gulf of Bothnia–Central Europe RoRo service. The existing Kaskinen–Travemünde route (opened June 2025) provides a pilot foundation. Secure anchor tenant volume commitments from major industrial shippers (Metsä Group, Stora Enso) and logistics operators (DHL, DSV) as a precondition for carrier commitment. Run pilot freight movements to collect empirical data on transit times, costs, and emissions.
CEF (Connecting Europe Facility) is the appropriate instrument for port infrastructure, terminal development, and rail connection investment. Innovation Fund and REPowerEU apply to the Laanila electrolysis investment. A portfolio application — combining Laanila with other SGFA nodes (Tampere, Varkaus, Harjavalta, Vantaa) — is structurally stronger than a single-project application. Finnish pension funds (Ilmarinen, Varma, Keva) represent patient capital appropriate for infrastructure with stable cash flows (FCR reserve market contracts, option value). Hub ownership structure: port company, municipality, pension funds, logistics operators — a cooperative model consistent with the SGFA Holding Oy structure in SP-002.
Regular pilot freight movements on the Kaskinen–Travemünde route (2–3 sailings per week). Systematic measurement of emissions (CO₂, NOₓ, particulates) against road transport baseline. Cost accounting per unit. Schedule reliability and transit time measurement. Public reporting of results for use in EU funding negotiations and carrier discussions. Laanila electrolysis investment decision should be secured in this phase.
Expand pilot route to include Oulu port as volumes grow. Develop Oulu port logistics terminal: electric vehicle charging, hydrogen fuelling, methane liquefaction for marine fuel, rail connection. Market the operating ecosystem to other Gulf of Bothnia ports and adjacent industrial sectors. Policy engagement targets: TEM and LVM for CEF allocation, European Commission for energy resilience facility (SM-010 §5), parliament for security-of-supply reporting mandate covering freight logistics.
This working paper draws on publicly available sources (Fingrid, TEM, ENTSO-E, ACI WP-019, SM-010, CN-007) and operational knowledge of Nordic maritime logistics. The following items require verification before investment-grade analysis:
Laanila investment decision status: What is the current state of the P2X Solutions electrolysis investment decision? If delayed from the expected autumn 2025 timing, what is the specific constraint: financing, permits, technology readiness, or partner commitment?
RoRo route capacity and flexibility: What is the current sailing frequency and capacity of the Kaskinen–Travemünde route? Can Wallenius SOL (South Enabler) or other carriers commit to additional capacity against industrial volume guarantees?
Open competitive test of operator/pricing model (revised 2026-08, supersedes narrower VR-specific framing): per §1.5, the relevant open question is not whether VR Transpoint's specific relaunch proposal is competitive, but whether a competitive intermodal Helsinki–Oulu service is achievable under any operator and pricing structure. The concrete test: an open market-dialogue or tender exercise (Helsinki/Vuosaari–Oulu, 20 vehicles or 30 trailers per weekday each direction) inviting any interested rail freight operator — VR Transpoint or otherwise — to quote €/trailer, transit time, and reliability to an independent, non-affiliated shipper. This produces the first genuinely comparable intermodal-vs-road rate for this corridor. Until this test is run, the modal-shift assumption in §2.2b should be treated as unverified in either direction.
Precise emissions coefficients: EcoTransIT World standard coefficients for the specific vessel types operating Gulf of Bothnia routes versus heavy road transport on equivalent routes. To be verified empirically in pilot phase.
Option value calculation for Finnish context: WP-019's 90–120 M€/TWh estimate uses the March 2026 TTF spike as reference. Finnish option value also depends on SE1–FI transmission capacity utilisation and Fingrid reserve market pricing. A more precise estimate requires Fingrid data and scenario analysis.
Regional employment and multiplier effects: Ruralia Institute figures (11–14 M€/year per energy-autonomous municipality) are indicative. A logistics hub adds employment multipliers not captured in the energy-only calculation. Requires sector-specific employment coefficients for Finnish conditions.
EU funding absorption capacity: Finland's RRF absorption rate has been below the European average, attributable to administrative pipeline capacity. A coordinating entity (SGFA Holding Oy or equivalent) capable of preparing portfolio applications is a prerequisite for effective EU funding access.
Security-of-supply freight risk quantification: What is the probability that Grimaldi or Spliethoff would redeploy vessels in a crisis scenario? What is the alternative cost if Gulf of Bothnia ports are without RoRo service for one week, two weeks, four weeks? This does not appear to have been assessed in the public HVK material reviewed for this paper.
The Laanila SGFA node is technically ready (YVA initiated, existing infrastructure operational) and economically viable at current TTF price levels (IRR 12–16% baseline, 18–22% at current prices per WP-019). The logistics gap is real and its cost is carried continuously by northern Finnish industry. The integration case is not speculative.
Domestic renewable fuel from Laanila can power domestic freight on Gulf of Bothnia routes. The closed-loop model produces approximately 146,000 tonnes CO₂ savings per year (indicative), regional economic multipliers in the 11–14 M€/year range per node, and security-of-supply option value of 90–120 M€/TWh. These figures are indicative but order-of-magnitude robust.
Neither pathway has stalled for technical or financial reasons. Both have stalled because no actor owns the integrated outcome. The three-gap diagnostic (SM-009) applies: the combined value is not measured, the absence of coordination carries no political cost, and no correction mechanism exists except crisis. The constraint is institutional, not technical.
Finland's Gulf of Bothnia freight connectivity depends almost entirely on non-Finnish carriers whose operational decisions are made outside Finland. This does not appear to have been assessed as a security-of-supply risk in the public HVK strategic material reviewed for this paper. It should be — using the same analytical framework applied to energy and digital infrastructure in SM-010.
Even without the Laanila hydrogen/e-methane integration, a direct Gulf of Bothnia RoRo service has an independent, quantified case: 29–42% lower emissions per tonne versus current southern-port-plus-domestic-road routing, a materially strengthened demand base since the route's 2013-era discontinuation (Oulu port +31% container volume in 2025, named industrial investment, modest but positive population growth), and corridor-level safety and capacity-economics considerations on VT4. For the domestic Helsinki–Oulu intermodal leg specifically, the 1990s pricing-distortion lesson (§1.4) does not settle the question either way — it shows that one vertically integrated operator's internal pricing was not cost-competitive with road, not that no achievable operator and pricing structure could be. Per §1.5, operator should be treated as endogenous: the synergy case should not be treated as confirmed or rejected until an open, competitive, arm's-length test — inviting any qualified operator to quote — has actually been run.
Recommendations for state actors (TEM, LVM, HVK): Assign coordination responsibility for the integrated Laanila–logistics hub development to a named entity with cross-ministerial mandate. Include freight logistics resilience in HVK strategic risk assessment. Allocate CEF funding to Oulu port terminal development. Establish annual parliamentary reporting on Gulf of Bothnia freight connectivity as a supply security indicator.
Recommendations for industrial actors (Metsä Group, Stora Enso, others): Form a working group to quantify collective freight volumes and negotiate anchor tenant commitments as a precondition for carrier route establishment. The route exists if volume is guaranteed; the volume exists if actors coordinate.
Recommendations for Oulu municipality and port: Include logistics hub terminal and hydrogen/methane fuelling infrastructure in strategic planning. Coordinate with P2X Solutions and Oulun Energia on investment timeline alignment.